Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Monday, March 30, 2009
Ecological Citizenship and Tactile Space
Ecological Citizenship and Tactile Space:
The Epistemic Significance of the Lived Experience
Michael S. Carolan
Colorado State University
Department of Sociology
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1784
mcarolan@lamar.colostate.edu
Abstract
A noticeable “turn” has occurred recently within green socio-political theory toward what has been called “ecological citizenship.” Increasing attention to questions of sustainability has led many green theorists down this road as they begin to think about issues of citizenship within an ecological context. Ecological citizenship is often described as involving deep commitments to both human and non-human communities, which, it is argued, are necessary if we hope to move toward a more sustainable society. The value of this form of citizenship comes in its ability to lead to long-lasting behavioral change, versus the superficial change that emerges in response to dis/incentives (which immediately cease once the reward/punishment is revoked). Yet such behavior requires that the ecological citizen be an informed citizen. It is here, concerning the epistemological assumptions embedded within discussions of ecological citizenship, where the focus of this paper centers. Those epistemological qualities must first be addressed if the ecological citizen is to have any real, transformative potential. Two case studied are examined where otherwise epistemologically distant phenomena are made more immediate to one’s realm of perception, each of which giving illustration to what I call “tactile space.”
Introduction
Individuals are becoming further enmeshed within a global world; a world (unequally) interconnected by way of global travel, information flows, and environmental and social problems (Held 2000; Sassen 1994; Urry 2003). Yet, there are two-sides to this philosophical coin: one ontological; the other epistemological. That is to say, with all this talk about how the world is, and how it is changing, we have yet to pay as close attention to the epistemic consequences of this new organization of place, space, and time. We find ourselves today eating food that has traveled thousands of kilometers to get to our diner plate; engaging in localized activities, from fertilizing our lawns and gardens to driving automobiles and heating our homes, which have global ecological consequences; and talking about abstract phenomena like “biodiversity” and “ecosystems.” To put it another way, we live in a world of increasing epistemic distance, where many of today’s artifacts of discussion and action have consequences beyond our everyday lived worlds.
In this paper, I place this epistemic state against calls within green political theory for the creation of an ecological citizen. Discussions of “green” citizenship have multiplied in recent years (e.g., Alabaster and Hawthorne 1999; Dean 2001; Hailwood 2005; Jelin 2000). Andrew Light (2002, 2003), for example, argues that ecological citizenship involves encouraging people to take on responsibility for each other in communities, which must include environmental dimensions. In a similar vain, Derek Bell (2005: 185) writes that an ecological citizen is a “citizen of plant Earth, he[/she] will have a (prima facie) duty to promote environmental justice around the world.” Andrew Dobson (2003) has also written extensively on the subject, arguing that ecological citizenship is non-territorial, non-contractual, and based upon obligations versus rights: to future generations, other species, and strangers. Or take Gill Seyfang’s (2005: 297) definition: “ecological citizenship entails reducing one’s unsustainable impacts upon the environment and other people.”
While the literature on ecological citizenship is diverse, a common thread connects them all: a general commitment to both the human and non-human world (recognizing that they are intimately interrelated). I share this hope of an emergent ecological citizenry, and believe the nurturing of green-minded individuals to be a noble goal (however “citizenship” is defined in the abstract). Yet I cannot help to think that these arguments are missing an important piece of the sustainability puzzle. That is, the issue of what a “good” ecological citizen is becomes moot if the aforementioned epistemological issues are not first addressed in a practical way. Regardless of the conceptual form it takes, an ecological citizen is an informed citizen. As I argue, the role of information/knowledge is essential in the development and maintenance of such a citizenry. Indeed, how could anyone be expected to make an informed decision about the ecological impacts of their actions without information about the consequences of those actions (whether referring to, for example, consumption patterns, transportation habits, or recycling tendencies)?
This paper is thus not about ecological citizenship per se. I do not delve into political theory and carve out my own definition of what I think the term means. My goal is admittedly more modest. Yet it speaks to a fundamental issue that, until addressed, will continue to make discussions of the ecological citizen a largely academic exercise. Specifically, it addresses how we can make those epistemologically distant aspects of modern life more meaningful to individuals in terms of their everyday lives. Thus, rather than speaking to what such a citizen represents within the traditional guises of liberalism and civic republicanism (or, for Dobson [2003], “post-cosmopolitanism”)—which is where much of the current debate resides—I address its epistemic requirements; requirements that, until addressed, will present a significant hurdle to its actualization. By focusing on the epistemic consequences of modernity, and on how we can make those distant artifacts more meaningful and thus “real” (in a socio-material sort of way), my intention is to provide an analysis that can be informative to all framings of ecological citizenship.
While this paper addresses a general blindspot found throughout the ecological citizenship literature, given this literature’s growing breadth I have chosen to speak specifically to Andrew Dobson’s (2003) work on this topic. I do this not only due to his preeminence in the subject area, but also because his elucidation of the concept represents the most systematic and complete to date. To begin, I thus provide a brief overview of Dobson’s conception of ecological citizenship. The concept of epistemic distance is then introduced as a barrier to ecological citizenship. I then discuss some frequently employed strategies to reduce this distance, in addition to the opportunities and limitations these strategies create for the emergence of an ecological citizenry. The concept of tactile space is then presented as a potential tool for nurturing such a citizenship. Two brief case studies are then discussed as examples of such spaces, with a particular focus placed on their ability to create deep transformative change (a necessary step on the road to ecological citizenship). As detailed, because of this ability to create lived experiences of these otherwise distant phenomena, tactile spaces have the potential for instilling within (at least some) individuals long-lasting behavioral changes. And in doing this, they are found to be valuable sites in the quest to nurture an emergent ecological citizenry.
An Introduction to Dobson’s Ecological Citizen
Rather than beginning with a symmetrical picture of globalization—full of flows, global commodity chains, and stretched relations across space and time (terms that are all metaphorically devoid of power relations and inequality)—Dobson (2003), building upon the insights of such scholars as Shiva (1998) and Bauman (1998), begins with the idea of asymmetry. This is based upon the argument that being global is fundamentally unbalanced: “It is truer than it ever was that ‘if America sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold,’ but Bangladesh can contract viral pneumonia without it making the slightest difference to the United States” (Dobson 2003: 13). And in highlighting the asymmetrical nature of globalization—recognizing that such asymmetries undermine arguments in favor of viewing obligations as reciprocally owed—Dobson begins laying a materially produced ethical groundwork for his ecological citizen.
One example given is the Kyoto protocol on climate change, which, in spite of requiring quite modest cuts to greenhouse gas emissions, still saw the United States drop out of the agreement in 2001. The reason given by the US for walking away from Kyoto—despite representing only five percent of the world’s population yet producing 25 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases—was that the protocol was fundamentally unfair by not treating all countries equally (it exempts developing countries in the short term). In the shadow of the Kyoto protocol, Dobson then proceeds to describe the quite dire situation that the Pacific nation of Kiribati finds itself in. Having already lost two of its islands to rising sea levels (due to, it is believed, global climate change), they, along with other small island nations, have formed a group called the Alliance of Small Island States. In the words of Dobson (2003: 24):
“The Small Island States’ view of the appropriate patterns of obligation in the global warming context is a good example of the non-reciprocal nature of obligation that I believe is implied by an asymmetrically globalizing world. It would be odd, to say the least, to claim that inhabitants of the Small Island States (excepting those few who make a net contribution to global warming) have CO2-based obligations to me, for example.”
Dobson uses the concept of the “ecological footprint” (Wackernagel and Rees 1996) to define the political space of ecological citizenship. Through this, duties can be defined between those who occupy too much ecological space and those who do not occupy enough. And out of this asymmetry emerges the non-reciprocal, non-contractual, and non-territorial commitments that Dobson speaks of. In short, Dobson’s ecological citizen seeks to reduce unjust distributions of ecological space, while concomitantly bringing overall societal impacts on the environment to levels that are sustainable (although Dobson admits that “sustainability” is largely, if not entirely, a normative issue).
In developing this argument, Dobson places tremendous significance on the phenomenon of geophysical distance. Yet the phenomenon of real, physical distance, as an ontological statement about the asymmetrical global world (which is where justification for these non-reciprocal obligations reside), has an epistemological correlate that Dobson has yet to fully address. In Dobson’s (2003: 105) own words:
“The effects that give rise to ecological citizenship are best captured in terms of ‘action at a distance.’ The contiguous territorial metaphors that are common to both liberal and civic republican citizenship are unhelpful here. Even cosmopolitan citizenship shares the idea of contiguous territory in the guise of ‘one world.’ In contrast, the key ecological citizenship point is that the footprint is not usually a continuous piece of land or land of one particular type or quality. The globalization of trade has increased the likelihood that the bioreproductive areas required to support the consumption—of the richer countries at least—are scattered all over the planet.”
Yet, this begs an important question: just how effective can one be in reducing their ecological footprint if they lack important feedback mechanisms (which globalization has helped to erode) to inform them of the very ecological and social effects that they are seeking to reduce? In other words, Dobson fails to fully problematize this idea of “action at a distance.” In addition to this distance being an ontological state, which Dobson fully recognizes, we must not forget that it represents an epistemological state as well. And in the presence of epistemic distance, purposeful action (at a distance) becomes difficult from the perspective of the individual.
Short of growing our own food (or buying it exclusively from local growers [which for most of the world is not possible on a year-round basis]), making our own clothes, and living entirely “off the grid,” can an ecological citizen exist in today’s global world that is full of abstract structures, asymmetrical flows, and placeless and faceless commodities and commitments? For this to happen, it is clear that strategies and practices must be put into place to re-embed and thus make meaningful to individuals the otherwise distant artifacts of a global, disembedded, modern world. Only then can an individual make purposeful decisions about their actions and engage in “action at a distance” with the type of intentionality that Dobson imbues within his ecological citizen.
This underscores an important component currently missing within Dobson’s conceptualization of ecological citizenship (a critique that could equally apply to all conceptions [that I am familiar with at least] of the concept). Ultimately, an ecological citizen presupposes an informed citizen, in the sense of having access to information about the consequences of their actions—otherwise, how would such an individual know which decisions are more “sustainable” than others? Without practical attention to this epistemic component, the ecological citizen loses much of its transformational potential.
Introducing Epistemic Distance
Epistemic distance is conceptual shorthand to speak of those socio-biophysical objects, effects, and relationships that are beyond direct perception. Epistemic distance can exist in a number of different forms: e.g., 1) through temporal and spatial extension, as when a cause and effect relationship is delayed over time (thus making the effect not immediate); 2) through complexity and/or uncertainty; and 3) through practice, recognizing that socio-material arrangements give shape to how and what we know and thus what we “see.” I now speak briefly to each of these distancing effects in turn (see Carolan [2006a] for a more detailed list and discussion).
Temporal/Spatial Extension
Temporal extension speaks to the epistemic effects of spreading processes and relationships out over time and space. Globalization is a leading force behind this form of epistemic distance (Princen 2002). Here, commodity chains and environmental flows are rendered abstract and largely invisible from the perspective of the citizen consumer, save for the few “points” made visible through such strategies as consumer labeling and surveillance (a point discussed in greater detail shortly). As a result, individuals find themselves having to confront a faceless and placeless socio-techno-economic system of which they have very little knowledge of. Where did this product come from? How was it made? Who made it? How much “embedded energy” does this product represent? The difficultly in answering these questions for many of the products purchased today speaks to the significant degree to which commodity chains remain epistemologically distant to most (if not to some degree all) consumers.
This elongation of relationships over time- and space-scales likewise describes the epistemic distant of many of today’s environmental problems. Given that such problems—from, for example, global climate change, to air and water pollution—are the cumulative effects of many actions and actors over time, individuals often have a difficult time “seeing” how their actions can make a difference in the greater scheme of things (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). This distance is reflected in individuals not being able to perceive how their actions are contributing to a far away problem—such as the cumulative effects of a relatively small, but repeated action, on phenomena many kilometers away (e.g., fertilizing one’s lawn and its impact on the Dead Zone in the Gulf of Mexico). Conversely, this distance can also lead to apathy, as people fail to perceive how their individual actions—such as switching to a high efficiency furnace or recycling—could be of any consequence to global environmental problems that seem beyond their realm of control.
Complexity/Uncertainty
The complexity of a relationship can also affect the degree to which it (and its effects) is perceivable to individuals. The numerous systems involved in environmental debates—from, for example, the social, ecological, and economic realms—often results in an emergent complexity far greater than the sum of its parts. All of which creates significant epistemic hurdles when it comes to “seeing” and understanding the broader systemic consequences of our individual actions.
Take, for example, global climate change. From positive and negative feedback, to self-organizing systems, to the “resiliency” of an ecosystem, complexity lies at the very heart of understanding the causes and consequences of climate change. Thus, versus the simple linear relationship between, for instance, dumping animal manure in a stream and seeing, feeling, and smelling a stream full of animal waste, the linkages involved in global climate change are nowhere near as direct to our senses. All of which, in the end, makes them far more open to interpretation, potential manipulation, and contestation (Carolan 2004).
Practice
To speak of practice in the context of epistemic distance is to highlight that knowing is always “situated” (Haraway 1992). What we do, in other words, in terms of the methods and techniques we employ, shapes what we “see” and thus what we know (Carolan 2006b, 2006d; Law and Urry 2004; Mol 2002). Take the following example from James Lovelock. This specific case involves the epistemologically distant phenomena that we refer to as the “hole” in the ozone layer. In the words of Lovelock (as quoted in Midgley [1992: 59]):
“[S]o sure were the computer programmers that they knew all that mattered about the stratosphere, they programmed the instruments aboard the satellite, that observed atmospheric ozone from above, to reject data that was substantially different from the model predictions. The instruments saw the hole, but those in charge of the experiment ignored it, saying in effect, ‘Don’t bother us with facts; our model knows best’.”
To be clear, this is not to suggest that such technologies actually bring into being the artifacts that they purport to “see.” Thus, just like “people don’t cease to have a nose when being weighed,” as Feyerabend (2000: 14) once quipped, environmental phenomena do not go in and out of existence with the advent or passing of technologies, methods, and tests. The point, rather, is that the methods we employ cannot be bracketed from the knowledge itself. Rather, they play an essential part in shaping our understanding, knowledge, and perception of environmental phenomena.
Reducing Epistemic Distance: Some Strategies
My point in highlighting the various ways in which epistemic distance is created is to emphasize why questions of knowledge need to be further reflected upon by scholars of ecological citizenship. As illustrated above, our knowledge of environmental phenomena are mediated through a number of routes. And each can greatly hinder our ability to make informed decisions when it comes to engaging in “green” behaviors.
An ecological citizen is one that thinks globally, while acting and organizing locally (to build upon the well-worn environmental slogan). Yet, to do this (thinking globally) requires a certain degree of knowledge about processes that exist beyond our everyday lived worlds, from holes in the ozone layer, to sweatshops in far away lands, shrinking rainforests, eroding farmlands, and hypoxic zones in the oceans. This requires the implementation of strategies and techniques to make these epistemologically distant processes, artifacts, and effects of modernity more meaningful to individuals in an everyday way. In what follows, I describe a handful of examples where epistemic distance, in its various guises, has been reduced by different means.
Rethinking Everyday Practices
While those with “green” leanings often think “big” when thinking ecologically—such as erecting solar panels to get one’s house “off the grind” or pledging to use only public transportation (or one’s bike)— often forgotten is that even our most mundane practices have significant ecological consequences. These practices are rarely thought of given their relative invisibility. And this is particularly true of those socio-techno systems, such as water, gas, sewage, and electricity; systems that we rely upon throughout the day, but which rarely enter into our consciousness (except in the event of a disruption of these “services”) (Guy and Shove 2000). Examples exist, however, where these largely invisible systems are rendered visible and more epistemologically immediate, with noticeable effect.
Take, for example, Obragas. Obragas is a utility company in the Netherlands. Between 1997 and 1998, they carried out a monitoring experiment in Helmond (a medium sized city in the Netherlands). This experiment sought to better understand whether consumer behaviour toward such mundane and thus largely “invisible” artefacts as water, gas, and electricity would change in the presence of “feedback” (greater information through surveillance). In this experiment, 29 households, living in newly built, energy-efficient houses, participated on a voluntary basis. In each of these homes, a special device was installed to record data from the electricity-, water- and gas-meters, information that was then sent, by way of a two-way TV-cable, to Obragas’ computer network. Consumers could then monitor their weekly consumption of water, gas, and electricity by accessing this informational network. In doing this, consumption levels were compared and visualized to the consumer through the use of smiling, neutral, or frowning faces. And the results were noticeable: water consumption was reduced by 18 percent, while gas and electricity consumption was reduced by 23 and 15 percent respectively (van den Burg et al. 2003).
In the end, the consumption of such mundane artifacts as water, gas, and electricity continue to escape human consciousness and reflexivity (Stern 1992; Gardner and Stern 1996). Thus, while, for example, operating the stovetop or having a hot shower is clearly a visible and conscious act, the relationship between these activities and the associated electricity, water, and/or gas consumption it requires is fundamentally indirect (Pedersen 2000). The consumption of these resources, however, lie at the core of our (at least those of us in the West) everyday activities, which would suggest that ecological citizenship would (or should) start here. Much research thus remains to be done on examining what is often called “household metabolism” if we hope to make more visible all of the “consuming” that occurs in the home (versus viewing consumption as something reserved for only the mall or grocery store [the public sphere]) (Moll et al. 2005).
Other mechanisms for reducing epistemic distance can be found in our agro-food system. Food labels seek to create “access points” to faraway lands and practices. “Fair trade” (Murray and Raynolds 2000), “organic” (Mansfield 2004), “GM free” (Teisl et al. 2002): numerous examples can be found of labeling being employed to attach information to a particular food commodity. Food labels allow us to “see,” for example, whether or not pesticides or herbicides where used in the raising of a given food, where a food was grown, and/or who was involved in that process. Another attempt to reduce this distance can be found in calculating what are called “food miles” (Boge 1993; Halweil 2002). Through the calculation of food miles, another aspect of our food system is made visible to the consumer that would otherwise remain hidden and distant: namely, the embedded energy (and waste) that went into transporting the food in question.
These strategies, however, are not with their problems. Like any attempt to “see” what is otherwise epistemologically distant, labels and food miles only reveal a piece of what is in reality a much larger whole. Thus, in shedding light on one aspect of a commodity (e.g., tons of fossil fuel burned in transporting food X from location Z to location Y), others components risk becoming even further hidden in the shadows (e.g., the energy consumed raising locally produced food in heated greenhouses).
A more fundamental question, however, still remains: do such strategies instill within people the ecological proclivities defined within ecological citizenship or does their use rest upon already existent “green” leanings? While such strategies are a step in the correct direction, I question if they instill within individuals the type of deep, non-instrumental commitments to the human and non-human realms as defined by ecological citizenship. In other words, while these strategies no doubt help individuals be more informed consumers, I question their potential to radically alter how individuals view the world around them.
Yet there remain still other means by which epistemic distance can be reduced. And while more epistemologically involved than those described above, they show potential for creating the type of deep commitments implied in ecological citizenship. Enter tactile spaces.
Ecological Citizenship and Tactile Space
Two cases will now be briefly examined that represent examples of what I call tactile space. The potential of these spaces reside not only in making abstract artifacts and processes meaningful to the everyday lives of individuals, which thus provides these spaces with the ability to reduce the earlier mentioned phenomenon of epistemic distance. But also, perhaps because of this ability to create lived experiences of these otherwise distant phenomena, tactile spaces have, as we shall see, the potential for instilling within individuals long-lasting behavioral changes. Such a discussion has particular relevance for the concept given Dobson’s (2003: 211) interest in investigating the merits of teaching ecological citizenship via the formal channels of the classroom (by looking at high school citizenship education programs in the UK). Against this, I argue that ecological citizenship is less something that one learns in the monological environment of a classroom and more something one tacitly experiences via a dialogue between self, others, and the environment. In what follows, a seed bank and two cases of community support agriculture are examined for the tactile spaces they create and support.
Case #1: Seed Savers Exchange
Data collection for this case study began in the summer of 2004. Twenty-two interviews were conducted between the months of June and July. After spending a number of months examining the data and emergent categories from these initial interviews, I then re-entered the field in the late-spring of 2005 to explore these categories further. Two additional visits were made to the research site at this time. During each, interviews were conducted, for a total of six additional interviews. In all, 28 interviews were conducted for this study. The length of each interview spanned from 20 minutes to, in a few cases, slightly over an hour. On average, however, interviews lasted between 30 and 40 minutes. In addition to personal interviews, copious field notes were also taken about the space itself (see e.g., Carolan [2006c] for a more detailed discussion of methods).
Seed Savers Exchange (SSE) is located near the town of Decorah, Iowa (US), in the far northeast corner of the state. Founded in 1975, SSE is a non-profit seed bank that both saves and sells “heirloom” fruit, vegetable, and flower seeds. On this 890 acre farm, which also goes by the name of “The Heritage Farm,” one will find a diverse genetic legacy. On it, there are 24,000 rare vegetable varieties, including about 4,000 “traditional” varieties from Eastern Europe and Russia. In addition, SSE possesses approximately 700 pre-1900 varieties of apples, which represent about every remaining pre-1900 variety left in existence (out of about 8,000 that once existed), and approximately 80 Ancient White Park Cattle (only about 800 of these animals remain in the world).
Unlike more conventional gene banks, SSE does not merely seek to store away genetic material in cold storage. SSE also works to make others interested in the seed saving process. Toward this end, they not only make available for sale the seeds being conserved (through a strong catalog and internet business as well as in their newly built visitors’ center), but they also teach others how to save their own seeds (through books, public lectures on the subject, tours, and annual meetings).
What one finds, then, upon entering SSE is a space build around the significance of tactile, embodied knowledge. Here, knowledge is not simply something one passively acquires by reading it or having it told to them. Rather, knowledge is actively acquired through doing and experiencing. Individuals therefore come to know the abstract, distant thing we call “agricultural biodiversity” by walking through the gardens and visitors’ center (where many of the seeds are on display) and by feeling seeds and various fruits and vegetables in their hands. Rather than knowing “the gene” of methodological reductionism—that is, as coded bits of protein as found in more conventional genes banks—individuals that visit SSE experience it for the ecologically embedded entity that it is. To know the genes of, say, Grandpa Ott’s Morning Glory (a small purple flower with a red star in the throat), is to know its evolutionary and socio-historical lineage (such as the point that it was brought from Bavaria to Iowa in the 1870s), to smell it, and feel it between one’s fingers. The knowledge conveyed at SSE, then, is not only tactile but also tacit, which is to say that the information one acquires through this space could never be conveyed linguistically in its entirety. It is obtained through doing, rather than through solely reading or listening (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Picture taken by Michael S. Carolan
I have spoken in detail of the epistemic immediacy of this space elsewhere (see e.g., Carolan 2006c). What interests me here, rather, is the transformational potential of this space, which is to say its ability to instill within individuals a deep, non-instrumental commitment to the human and non-human realms. The question then becomes: are their indications that SSE has the ability to instill within individuals such commitments? It appears so.
As one visitor explained to me, “I never fully appreciated things like genes and seeds before coming here. It’s just not something we’re taught to appreciate in this day and age. […] I guess you could say that this place has opened my eyes.”
While another explained, “I enjoy coming here with my kids because it provides an opportunity for learning that you just can’t get at school or by reading a book. The stuff here is real; you can feel it and take it home and grow it yourself. It’s just so much more accessible than a two-dimensional picture.”
Still another visitor explained it this way: “Seed Savers [SSE] has had a real effect on me. You just get such a deep appreciation for nature here. But it’s also more than that; you develop a greater appreciation for other people too. You meet so many wonderful and interesting people through this organization.”
These statements speak to a point made by Dobson (2003: 211), where he questions whether ecological citizenship can be taught within the formal channels of the classroom (which is somewhat surprising given his focus on high school citizenship education programs in the UK). Instead, he wonders if “lived experiences”—through which tacit knowledge is acquired—are not more effective for such transformations. The data collected from this space appear to suggest that they are.
Yet attitudes were not the only things that were changed through the experiences acquired at SSE. So too were practices. Comments like the following, which describe such behavioral chances, were not uncommon from the visitors I spoke with.
“I started gardening because of this place. […] Most of the vegetables that we eat in the summer now come from our garden.”
“I no longer buy my own seeds [because of what was learned through this space]. Why contribute to the problem when you can be the solution? It’s a good feeling knowing that you’re helping to keep these traditional varieties going.”
“This place opened my eyes to how agri-business, with its new hybrid varieties, has really taken a lot away from us. […] I’d say it’s in part because of this place, and the great people I’ve meet here, that I started going to farmers’ markets [as a grower] on a regular basis.”
In the end, it appears that SSE, in making such abstract and often only indirectly known phenomena as “genes” and “biodiversity” more meaningful to individuals, deeply affected how visitors of this space came to view these entities. And in some cases, those effects appeared to remain with individuals even after they had left the grounds of SSE. In those instances, then, something similar to ecological citizenship appears to have emerged.
These deep, non-instrumental commitments and obligations were no doubt an intentional goal of this space. If this were not the case, SSE could have adopted a more instrumental model of preservation, like that found at conventional gene banks. Rather, those interviewed spoke nothing of expecting something in return for their personal seed saving and gardening endeavors. Nor did respondents speak of reciprocal obligations. Indeed, one individual put this point clearly when she stated, “[Those of us in developed countries] need to step up and preserve these seeds since we are the ones responsible for their demise.”
The obligations this space evoked thus appeared to take a much “deeper” form. As one respondent put it, “I save seeds and do my part [for the environment] not because I have to, but because that is simply what one should do.” In short, it appears that SSE was doing much more than simply saving seeds. There are strong indications that it is also changing attitudes and shaping behaviors.
Case Study #2: Community Supported Agriculture
It has become almost a truism to speak of the global food system. Much of what we eat in the developed world has traveled many hundred (if not thousands) of kilometers before arriving on our dinner plate (Iles 2005). Food and agriculture more generally have become evermore faceless and placeless as consumers, producers, and the growing marketing sector are increasingly separated in geophysical space (Hendrickson and Heffernan 2002). In short, food, which is embedded within the global agro-food system, has become epistemologically distant from us and our lived worlds.
Spaces are emerging, however, that are seeking to reduce that distance, in both ontological (geospatial) and epistemological (meaningfulness to our everyday lives) terms. And these spaces, in making food more meaningful to the everyday lived world of individuals, can be seen as sowing the seeds for potentially significant changes in terms of individual attitudes and behaviors. Community supported agriculture (CSA) is one example of just such a space.
Research for this case study was conducted in the summer of 2003. Two CSAs located in central Iowa (US) were examined. In all, 22 personal interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. To further supplement the data, participant observation techniques were also employed (which were conducted while lending a hand gardening and delivering food to consumers). This led to approximately 10 additional hours of observations and informal discussions. All observations and interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed.
CSA consists of a group of individuals who pledge support to a farm or a group of farms and thus work together to create a local food system. Usually, members (or “share-holders”) pledge in advance to cover the anticipated costs for the year. CSA is therefore different from direct marketing because members commit to a full-season price in the spring and thus share in some of the risks that are inherent in farming. In return, members receive shares of what is produced for the year, as well as satisfaction gained from reconnecting to the land and participating in food production. In addition to receiving locally produced food, members are also encouraged to visit the farms and walk through the gardens to experience first hand where their food comes from and how it is grown. In short, CSA seeks to reduce the distance—in both physical and epistemological terms—between consumers, growers, and food. And the case study CSAs that were studied are of no exception.
Not only did consumers and growers meet each other on a regular basis, thus placing a face (literally) on the food they consumed. At both CSAs examined, “volunteer parties” were also held a few times a year, which brought non-growers to the farm to help harvest (which, it should be noted, is not a typical event for many CSAs). Such practices had the combined effect of reconnecting consumers and producers at a level rarely experienced in today’s global food system. Through such practices, consumers could put a face to their food and on who grew their food, while producers could put a face to those they helped to feed.
Like the seed banks described earlier, the CSAs examined also provided consumers with tacit knowledge. Ask any first-time farmer and they will tell you that food production is not something that can be completely taught to you. Rather, it is something you learn through doing. Non-growers, then, not only helped to pick their food, while attending such events as “volunteer parties,” but they also got an education in the process.
As one individual quipped, “You really can’t appreciate what goes into growing your food unless you actually participate in that process.”
While another explained, “The global food system leaves the consumer out in the cold, largely ignorant of all that goes into making our food—how it is raise, processed, packaged, shipped. […] We have no idea about what goes into producing the food we eat. That’s what I like about CSAs. All those barriers are torn down because we can experience the whole thing on a first hand basis.”
Sentiments like these were frequently expressed by respondents. The CSAs in question created a space where people, whether they were producers or consumers, could get to know “first hand” the entire food commodity chain from seed to dinner plate. Yet this was not the shallow form of knowledge created through a food label or point of origin stamp, which simply conveys information while allowing for no dialogic exchange to occur. At the CSAs examined (like SSE described earlier), individuals could actually walk through the gardens (e.g., during those aforementioned volunteer parties) that contained their food and experience that space in an immediate, tactile way. Knowledge thus became an embodied and active process, which involved doing and thus experiencing knowledge claims in a way that was meaningful to participants. Whereas the conventional food system often provides little insight into the practices used to raise our food, the CSAs studied allowed consumers the opportunity to not only to talk to farmers directly but also gave them the chance to participate in that very production process. Consumers could thus see, literally, the food as it was being raised as well as the methods employed and the values that guided that production process.
Admittedly, this meant that customers had to first be willing to take advantage of these opportunities. Thus, there might have been something “special” to begin with about those who chose to participate in the harvesting process, versus those who simply paid their annual subscription and had the food delivered to their doorstep (with their “participation” ending there). The transformational potential of these spaces has to thus be slightly tempered by the possibility that those most transformed by them likely had certain ecological citizenship-like proclivities to begin with. Yet this need not take away from the point that, at least among those that chose to engage with this space, attitudes and behaviors were significantly altered for some as a result of this embodied experience.
As one consumer explained, “CSAs almost force you to rethink our current situation. The freshness of the food, the quality, the social connections made—why can’t we grow more food like this? I started this to get cheap vegetables, but over the years I’ve learn that this is a more just way of growing and consuming food. I’d never go back.”
The above quote highlights an important component to what Dobson and others view as indication of the emergence of an ecological citizen: a deep commitment to the human and non-human realms motivated by non-instrumental, non-reciprocal beliefs. This is not to claim that all involved in the case study CSAs were radically transformed by such operations. A few, however, did indicate having undergone a certain transformation after being introduced to these spaces (such as the individual quoted above).
“Once I began questioning and wanting to know my food better I found myself wanting to have similar information about more of the products I buy.”
“Participating in CSAs has helped me to appreciate the value of not only food, it has also taught me to think about issues of equity and justice whenever I’m buying something. […] I’ve since switched to buying more fair trade and locally produced goods now because of my experience with CSAs.”
Statements such as these could be viewed as indicating the emergence of an (ecological) individual who views obligations toward human and non-humankind in non-reciprocal, non-contractual terms. In other words, the CSAs examined appeared to have a deep, lasting impact on at least some of its participants (although certainly not all). This is perhaps the most important (and hopeful) point to glean from this case study. For arguably the most salient component of ecological citizenship is the importance it places on deep commitments to issues of sustainability (however it is defined), versus a shallow type of human motivation that hinges on dis/incentives (which tend to cease once the dis/incentive is revoked). And such commitments appear to have been, at least in part, an effect of the tactile spaces and experiences that the CSAs examined helped to produce. As one grower quipped, “The ‘out of sight/out of mind’ mentality is just so prevalent today. CSAs attempt to bring food back into sight, which I believe has a big effect on how we think about food.”
Next Steps
One response to Dobson’s (2003: 174) question concerning “how do people become environmental or ecological citizens?” hinges on the lived experience. Gleaning insight from the case studies above, ecological citizenship could arguably be viewed as less something one learns (in the sense of being “schooled” on ecological citizenship) and more something one tacitly experiences. This brings us back to the point concerning the epistemic distance of the world around us and how it can problematize our abilities to think and act in sustainable ways. For as long as individuals remain epistemologically distant from many of the processes, effects, and artifacts of modernity, teaching individuals about the finer points of ecological citizenship will have only limited success.
In the above case studies, tactile spaces were created to make those otherwise distant artifacts of modernity more meaningful to people in terms of their everyday lives. Such spaces took various forms and involved different socio-material practices. Yet, in the end, each had degrees of success in causing individuals to internalize experiences and gain knowledge of non-human nature.
It is thus essential that future discussions of ecological citizenship not neglect the ever-important issues of epistemology, particularly if we hope for the concept to have any real, transformative potential. With that said, it is clear that not all phenomena are equal when it comes to creating tactile spaces. For instance, the sheer scale and complexity of global climate change presents challenges toward this end. The importance of reducing epistemic distance, however, should nevertheless encourage us to work through these difficulties for reasons related to ecological citizenship in particular and enriching public debate more generally. For as environmental problems, commodity chains, and asymmetrical economic/information flows continue to become more global in their scope, attempts must be made to concomitantly ground such artifacts in the lived worlds of the citizenry.
References
Alabaster T. and M. Hawthorne. (1999) ‘Information for Environmental Citizenship’, Sustainable Development 7: 25-34.
Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences Cambridge: Polity.
Bell, D. (2005) ‘Liberal Environmental Citizenship’, Environmental Politics 14: 179-94.
Boge, S. (1993) Road Transportation of Goods and the Effect on the Environment. Wuppertal, Germany: Wuppertal Institute.
Carolan, M. S. (2004) ‘Ontological Politics: Mapping a Complex Environmental Problem’, Environmental Values 13:497-522.
. (2006a) ‘Do you see what I see? Examining the Epistemic Barriers to Sustainable Agriculture’, Rural Sociology forthcoming.
. (2006b) ‘Risk, Trust, and “the Beyond” of the Environment: A Brief Look at the Recent Case of Mad Cow Disease in the United States’, Environmental Values 15: 233-52.
. (2006c) ‘Ecological Representation in Deliberation: The Contribution of Tactile Spaces’, Environmental Politics 15: 345-61.
. (2006d) ‘Social Change and the Adoption and Adaptation of Knowledge Claims: Whose Truth do you Trust when it comes to Sustainable Agriculture?’ Agricultural and Human Values forthcoming.
Dean, H. (2001) ‘Green Citizenship’, Social Policy and Administration 35: 490-505.
Dobson, A. (2003) Citizenship and the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feyerabend, Paul (2000) The Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction vs. the Richness of Being. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Gardner G. and P. Stern (1996) Environmental Problems and Human Behavior. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Guy S. and E. Shove (2000) A Sociology of Energy, Buildings and the Environment: Constructing Knowledge, Designing Practice. New York: Routledge.
Hailwood, S. (2005) ‘Environmental Citizenship as Reasonable Citizenship’, Environmental Politics 14: 195-210.
Halweil, B. (2002) Home Grown: The Case for Local Food in a Global Market. Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute.
Haraway, D. (1992) Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Societies. London: Verso.
Held, D. (2000) ‘Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics’, International Sociology 15: 394-408.
Hendrickson M. and W. Heffernan (2002) ‘Opening Spaces through Relocalization: Locating Potential Resistance in the Weaknesses of the Global Food System’, Sociologia Ruralis 42: 347-69.
Iles, A. (2005) ‘Learning in Sustainable Agriculture: Food Miles and Missing Objects’, Environmental Values 14: 163-83.
Jelin, E. (2000) ‘Toward a Global Environmental Citizenship?’, Citizenship Studies 4: 47-63.
Kollmuss A. and J. Agyeman (2002) ‘Mind the Gap: Why do People act Environmentally and What are the Barriers to Pro-environmental Behavior?’, Environmental Education Research 8: 239-60.
Law, J. and J. Urry (2004) ‘Enacting the Social’, Economy and Society 33: 390-410.
Light, A. (2002) ‘Restoring Ecological Citizenship’, In B. Minteer and B. Taylor (eds.) Democracy and the Claims of Nature. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
. (2003) ‘Urban Ecological Citizenship’, Journal of Social Philosophy 34: 44-63.
Mansfield, B. (2004) ‘Organic Views of Nature: The Debate over Organic Certification for Aquatic Animals’, Sociologia Ruralis 44: 216-232.
Midgley, M. (1992) Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning. London; New York: Routledge.
Mol, A. (2002) The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Moll, H., K. Noorman, R. Kok, R. Engstrom, H. Throne-Holst, and C. Clark. (2005) ‘Pursuing More Sustainable Consumption by Analyzing Household Metabolism in European Countries and Cities’, Journal of Industrial Ecology 9: 259-75.
Murray, D. L. and L. T. Raynolds (2000) ‘Alternative Trade in Bananas: Obstacles and Opportunities for Progressive Social Change in the Global Economy’, Agriculture and Human Values 17: 65-74.
Pedersen, L. (2000) ‘The Dynamics of Green Consumption: A Matter of Visibility?’, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 2: 193-210.
Princen, T. (2002) ‘Distancing: Consumption and the Severing of Feedback’, In T. Princen, M. Maniates, and K. Conca (eds.) Confronting Consumption. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sassen, S. (1994) Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks/New York/London: Pine Forge Press.
Seyfang, G. (2005) ‘Shopping for Sustainability: Can Sustainable Consumption Promote Ecological Citizenhsip?, Environmental Politics 14: 290-306.
Shiva, V. (1998) ‘The Greening of Global Reach’, in G. Thuatail, S. Dalby, and P. Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, London: Routledge.
Stern P. (1992) ‘What Psychology Knows about Energy Conservation’, American Psychologist 47: 1224–1232.
Teisl M. F., L. Halverson, K. O’Brien, B. Roe, and N. Ross (2002) ‘Focus Group Reactions to Genetically Modified Food Labels’, AgBioForum 5: 6-9.
Urry, J. (2003) Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity
van den Burg, S., A. P.J. Mol, and G. Spaargaren (2003) ‘Consumer-Oriented Monitoring and Environmental Reform’, Environment and Planning 21: 371-388
Wackernagel M. and W. Rees (1996) Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers.
The Epistemic Significance of the Lived Experience
Michael S. Carolan
Colorado State University
Department of Sociology
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1784
mcarolan@lamar.colostate.edu
Abstract
A noticeable “turn” has occurred recently within green socio-political theory toward what has been called “ecological citizenship.” Increasing attention to questions of sustainability has led many green theorists down this road as they begin to think about issues of citizenship within an ecological context. Ecological citizenship is often described as involving deep commitments to both human and non-human communities, which, it is argued, are necessary if we hope to move toward a more sustainable society. The value of this form of citizenship comes in its ability to lead to long-lasting behavioral change, versus the superficial change that emerges in response to dis/incentives (which immediately cease once the reward/punishment is revoked). Yet such behavior requires that the ecological citizen be an informed citizen. It is here, concerning the epistemological assumptions embedded within discussions of ecological citizenship, where the focus of this paper centers. Those epistemological qualities must first be addressed if the ecological citizen is to have any real, transformative potential. Two case studied are examined where otherwise epistemologically distant phenomena are made more immediate to one’s realm of perception, each of which giving illustration to what I call “tactile space.”
Introduction
Individuals are becoming further enmeshed within a global world; a world (unequally) interconnected by way of global travel, information flows, and environmental and social problems (Held 2000; Sassen 1994; Urry 2003). Yet, there are two-sides to this philosophical coin: one ontological; the other epistemological. That is to say, with all this talk about how the world is, and how it is changing, we have yet to pay as close attention to the epistemic consequences of this new organization of place, space, and time. We find ourselves today eating food that has traveled thousands of kilometers to get to our diner plate; engaging in localized activities, from fertilizing our lawns and gardens to driving automobiles and heating our homes, which have global ecological consequences; and talking about abstract phenomena like “biodiversity” and “ecosystems.” To put it another way, we live in a world of increasing epistemic distance, where many of today’s artifacts of discussion and action have consequences beyond our everyday lived worlds.
In this paper, I place this epistemic state against calls within green political theory for the creation of an ecological citizen. Discussions of “green” citizenship have multiplied in recent years (e.g., Alabaster and Hawthorne 1999; Dean 2001; Hailwood 2005; Jelin 2000). Andrew Light (2002, 2003), for example, argues that ecological citizenship involves encouraging people to take on responsibility for each other in communities, which must include environmental dimensions. In a similar vain, Derek Bell (2005: 185) writes that an ecological citizen is a “citizen of plant Earth, he[/she] will have a (prima facie) duty to promote environmental justice around the world.” Andrew Dobson (2003) has also written extensively on the subject, arguing that ecological citizenship is non-territorial, non-contractual, and based upon obligations versus rights: to future generations, other species, and strangers. Or take Gill Seyfang’s (2005: 297) definition: “ecological citizenship entails reducing one’s unsustainable impacts upon the environment and other people.”
While the literature on ecological citizenship is diverse, a common thread connects them all: a general commitment to both the human and non-human world (recognizing that they are intimately interrelated). I share this hope of an emergent ecological citizenry, and believe the nurturing of green-minded individuals to be a noble goal (however “citizenship” is defined in the abstract). Yet I cannot help to think that these arguments are missing an important piece of the sustainability puzzle. That is, the issue of what a “good” ecological citizen is becomes moot if the aforementioned epistemological issues are not first addressed in a practical way. Regardless of the conceptual form it takes, an ecological citizen is an informed citizen. As I argue, the role of information/knowledge is essential in the development and maintenance of such a citizenry. Indeed, how could anyone be expected to make an informed decision about the ecological impacts of their actions without information about the consequences of those actions (whether referring to, for example, consumption patterns, transportation habits, or recycling tendencies)?
This paper is thus not about ecological citizenship per se. I do not delve into political theory and carve out my own definition of what I think the term means. My goal is admittedly more modest. Yet it speaks to a fundamental issue that, until addressed, will continue to make discussions of the ecological citizen a largely academic exercise. Specifically, it addresses how we can make those epistemologically distant aspects of modern life more meaningful to individuals in terms of their everyday lives. Thus, rather than speaking to what such a citizen represents within the traditional guises of liberalism and civic republicanism (or, for Dobson [2003], “post-cosmopolitanism”)—which is where much of the current debate resides—I address its epistemic requirements; requirements that, until addressed, will present a significant hurdle to its actualization. By focusing on the epistemic consequences of modernity, and on how we can make those distant artifacts more meaningful and thus “real” (in a socio-material sort of way), my intention is to provide an analysis that can be informative to all framings of ecological citizenship.
While this paper addresses a general blindspot found throughout the ecological citizenship literature, given this literature’s growing breadth I have chosen to speak specifically to Andrew Dobson’s (2003) work on this topic. I do this not only due to his preeminence in the subject area, but also because his elucidation of the concept represents the most systematic and complete to date. To begin, I thus provide a brief overview of Dobson’s conception of ecological citizenship. The concept of epistemic distance is then introduced as a barrier to ecological citizenship. I then discuss some frequently employed strategies to reduce this distance, in addition to the opportunities and limitations these strategies create for the emergence of an ecological citizenry. The concept of tactile space is then presented as a potential tool for nurturing such a citizenship. Two brief case studies are then discussed as examples of such spaces, with a particular focus placed on their ability to create deep transformative change (a necessary step on the road to ecological citizenship). As detailed, because of this ability to create lived experiences of these otherwise distant phenomena, tactile spaces have the potential for instilling within (at least some) individuals long-lasting behavioral changes. And in doing this, they are found to be valuable sites in the quest to nurture an emergent ecological citizenry.
An Introduction to Dobson’s Ecological Citizen
Rather than beginning with a symmetrical picture of globalization—full of flows, global commodity chains, and stretched relations across space and time (terms that are all metaphorically devoid of power relations and inequality)—Dobson (2003), building upon the insights of such scholars as Shiva (1998) and Bauman (1998), begins with the idea of asymmetry. This is based upon the argument that being global is fundamentally unbalanced: “It is truer than it ever was that ‘if America sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold,’ but Bangladesh can contract viral pneumonia without it making the slightest difference to the United States” (Dobson 2003: 13). And in highlighting the asymmetrical nature of globalization—recognizing that such asymmetries undermine arguments in favor of viewing obligations as reciprocally owed—Dobson begins laying a materially produced ethical groundwork for his ecological citizen.
One example given is the Kyoto protocol on climate change, which, in spite of requiring quite modest cuts to greenhouse gas emissions, still saw the United States drop out of the agreement in 2001. The reason given by the US for walking away from Kyoto—despite representing only five percent of the world’s population yet producing 25 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases—was that the protocol was fundamentally unfair by not treating all countries equally (it exempts developing countries in the short term). In the shadow of the Kyoto protocol, Dobson then proceeds to describe the quite dire situation that the Pacific nation of Kiribati finds itself in. Having already lost two of its islands to rising sea levels (due to, it is believed, global climate change), they, along with other small island nations, have formed a group called the Alliance of Small Island States. In the words of Dobson (2003: 24):
“The Small Island States’ view of the appropriate patterns of obligation in the global warming context is a good example of the non-reciprocal nature of obligation that I believe is implied by an asymmetrically globalizing world. It would be odd, to say the least, to claim that inhabitants of the Small Island States (excepting those few who make a net contribution to global warming) have CO2-based obligations to me, for example.”
Dobson uses the concept of the “ecological footprint” (Wackernagel and Rees 1996) to define the political space of ecological citizenship. Through this, duties can be defined between those who occupy too much ecological space and those who do not occupy enough. And out of this asymmetry emerges the non-reciprocal, non-contractual, and non-territorial commitments that Dobson speaks of. In short, Dobson’s ecological citizen seeks to reduce unjust distributions of ecological space, while concomitantly bringing overall societal impacts on the environment to levels that are sustainable (although Dobson admits that “sustainability” is largely, if not entirely, a normative issue).
In developing this argument, Dobson places tremendous significance on the phenomenon of geophysical distance. Yet the phenomenon of real, physical distance, as an ontological statement about the asymmetrical global world (which is where justification for these non-reciprocal obligations reside), has an epistemological correlate that Dobson has yet to fully address. In Dobson’s (2003: 105) own words:
“The effects that give rise to ecological citizenship are best captured in terms of ‘action at a distance.’ The contiguous territorial metaphors that are common to both liberal and civic republican citizenship are unhelpful here. Even cosmopolitan citizenship shares the idea of contiguous territory in the guise of ‘one world.’ In contrast, the key ecological citizenship point is that the footprint is not usually a continuous piece of land or land of one particular type or quality. The globalization of trade has increased the likelihood that the bioreproductive areas required to support the consumption—of the richer countries at least—are scattered all over the planet.”
Yet, this begs an important question: just how effective can one be in reducing their ecological footprint if they lack important feedback mechanisms (which globalization has helped to erode) to inform them of the very ecological and social effects that they are seeking to reduce? In other words, Dobson fails to fully problematize this idea of “action at a distance.” In addition to this distance being an ontological state, which Dobson fully recognizes, we must not forget that it represents an epistemological state as well. And in the presence of epistemic distance, purposeful action (at a distance) becomes difficult from the perspective of the individual.
Short of growing our own food (or buying it exclusively from local growers [which for most of the world is not possible on a year-round basis]), making our own clothes, and living entirely “off the grid,” can an ecological citizen exist in today’s global world that is full of abstract structures, asymmetrical flows, and placeless and faceless commodities and commitments? For this to happen, it is clear that strategies and practices must be put into place to re-embed and thus make meaningful to individuals the otherwise distant artifacts of a global, disembedded, modern world. Only then can an individual make purposeful decisions about their actions and engage in “action at a distance” with the type of intentionality that Dobson imbues within his ecological citizen.
This underscores an important component currently missing within Dobson’s conceptualization of ecological citizenship (a critique that could equally apply to all conceptions [that I am familiar with at least] of the concept). Ultimately, an ecological citizen presupposes an informed citizen, in the sense of having access to information about the consequences of their actions—otherwise, how would such an individual know which decisions are more “sustainable” than others? Without practical attention to this epistemic component, the ecological citizen loses much of its transformational potential.
Introducing Epistemic Distance
Epistemic distance is conceptual shorthand to speak of those socio-biophysical objects, effects, and relationships that are beyond direct perception. Epistemic distance can exist in a number of different forms: e.g., 1) through temporal and spatial extension, as when a cause and effect relationship is delayed over time (thus making the effect not immediate); 2) through complexity and/or uncertainty; and 3) through practice, recognizing that socio-material arrangements give shape to how and what we know and thus what we “see.” I now speak briefly to each of these distancing effects in turn (see Carolan [2006a] for a more detailed list and discussion).
Temporal/Spatial Extension
Temporal extension speaks to the epistemic effects of spreading processes and relationships out over time and space. Globalization is a leading force behind this form of epistemic distance (Princen 2002). Here, commodity chains and environmental flows are rendered abstract and largely invisible from the perspective of the citizen consumer, save for the few “points” made visible through such strategies as consumer labeling and surveillance (a point discussed in greater detail shortly). As a result, individuals find themselves having to confront a faceless and placeless socio-techno-economic system of which they have very little knowledge of. Where did this product come from? How was it made? Who made it? How much “embedded energy” does this product represent? The difficultly in answering these questions for many of the products purchased today speaks to the significant degree to which commodity chains remain epistemologically distant to most (if not to some degree all) consumers.
This elongation of relationships over time- and space-scales likewise describes the epistemic distant of many of today’s environmental problems. Given that such problems—from, for example, global climate change, to air and water pollution—are the cumulative effects of many actions and actors over time, individuals often have a difficult time “seeing” how their actions can make a difference in the greater scheme of things (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). This distance is reflected in individuals not being able to perceive how their actions are contributing to a far away problem—such as the cumulative effects of a relatively small, but repeated action, on phenomena many kilometers away (e.g., fertilizing one’s lawn and its impact on the Dead Zone in the Gulf of Mexico). Conversely, this distance can also lead to apathy, as people fail to perceive how their individual actions—such as switching to a high efficiency furnace or recycling—could be of any consequence to global environmental problems that seem beyond their realm of control.
Complexity/Uncertainty
The complexity of a relationship can also affect the degree to which it (and its effects) is perceivable to individuals. The numerous systems involved in environmental debates—from, for example, the social, ecological, and economic realms—often results in an emergent complexity far greater than the sum of its parts. All of which creates significant epistemic hurdles when it comes to “seeing” and understanding the broader systemic consequences of our individual actions.
Take, for example, global climate change. From positive and negative feedback, to self-organizing systems, to the “resiliency” of an ecosystem, complexity lies at the very heart of understanding the causes and consequences of climate change. Thus, versus the simple linear relationship between, for instance, dumping animal manure in a stream and seeing, feeling, and smelling a stream full of animal waste, the linkages involved in global climate change are nowhere near as direct to our senses. All of which, in the end, makes them far more open to interpretation, potential manipulation, and contestation (Carolan 2004).
Practice
To speak of practice in the context of epistemic distance is to highlight that knowing is always “situated” (Haraway 1992). What we do, in other words, in terms of the methods and techniques we employ, shapes what we “see” and thus what we know (Carolan 2006b, 2006d; Law and Urry 2004; Mol 2002). Take the following example from James Lovelock. This specific case involves the epistemologically distant phenomena that we refer to as the “hole” in the ozone layer. In the words of Lovelock (as quoted in Midgley [1992: 59]):
“[S]o sure were the computer programmers that they knew all that mattered about the stratosphere, they programmed the instruments aboard the satellite, that observed atmospheric ozone from above, to reject data that was substantially different from the model predictions. The instruments saw the hole, but those in charge of the experiment ignored it, saying in effect, ‘Don’t bother us with facts; our model knows best’.”
To be clear, this is not to suggest that such technologies actually bring into being the artifacts that they purport to “see.” Thus, just like “people don’t cease to have a nose when being weighed,” as Feyerabend (2000: 14) once quipped, environmental phenomena do not go in and out of existence with the advent or passing of technologies, methods, and tests. The point, rather, is that the methods we employ cannot be bracketed from the knowledge itself. Rather, they play an essential part in shaping our understanding, knowledge, and perception of environmental phenomena.
Reducing Epistemic Distance: Some Strategies
My point in highlighting the various ways in which epistemic distance is created is to emphasize why questions of knowledge need to be further reflected upon by scholars of ecological citizenship. As illustrated above, our knowledge of environmental phenomena are mediated through a number of routes. And each can greatly hinder our ability to make informed decisions when it comes to engaging in “green” behaviors.
An ecological citizen is one that thinks globally, while acting and organizing locally (to build upon the well-worn environmental slogan). Yet, to do this (thinking globally) requires a certain degree of knowledge about processes that exist beyond our everyday lived worlds, from holes in the ozone layer, to sweatshops in far away lands, shrinking rainforests, eroding farmlands, and hypoxic zones in the oceans. This requires the implementation of strategies and techniques to make these epistemologically distant processes, artifacts, and effects of modernity more meaningful to individuals in an everyday way. In what follows, I describe a handful of examples where epistemic distance, in its various guises, has been reduced by different means.
Rethinking Everyday Practices
While those with “green” leanings often think “big” when thinking ecologically—such as erecting solar panels to get one’s house “off the grind” or pledging to use only public transportation (or one’s bike)— often forgotten is that even our most mundane practices have significant ecological consequences. These practices are rarely thought of given their relative invisibility. And this is particularly true of those socio-techno systems, such as water, gas, sewage, and electricity; systems that we rely upon throughout the day, but which rarely enter into our consciousness (except in the event of a disruption of these “services”) (Guy and Shove 2000). Examples exist, however, where these largely invisible systems are rendered visible and more epistemologically immediate, with noticeable effect.
Take, for example, Obragas. Obragas is a utility company in the Netherlands. Between 1997 and 1998, they carried out a monitoring experiment in Helmond (a medium sized city in the Netherlands). This experiment sought to better understand whether consumer behaviour toward such mundane and thus largely “invisible” artefacts as water, gas, and electricity would change in the presence of “feedback” (greater information through surveillance). In this experiment, 29 households, living in newly built, energy-efficient houses, participated on a voluntary basis. In each of these homes, a special device was installed to record data from the electricity-, water- and gas-meters, information that was then sent, by way of a two-way TV-cable, to Obragas’ computer network. Consumers could then monitor their weekly consumption of water, gas, and electricity by accessing this informational network. In doing this, consumption levels were compared and visualized to the consumer through the use of smiling, neutral, or frowning faces. And the results were noticeable: water consumption was reduced by 18 percent, while gas and electricity consumption was reduced by 23 and 15 percent respectively (van den Burg et al. 2003).
In the end, the consumption of such mundane artifacts as water, gas, and electricity continue to escape human consciousness and reflexivity (Stern 1992; Gardner and Stern 1996). Thus, while, for example, operating the stovetop or having a hot shower is clearly a visible and conscious act, the relationship between these activities and the associated electricity, water, and/or gas consumption it requires is fundamentally indirect (Pedersen 2000). The consumption of these resources, however, lie at the core of our (at least those of us in the West) everyday activities, which would suggest that ecological citizenship would (or should) start here. Much research thus remains to be done on examining what is often called “household metabolism” if we hope to make more visible all of the “consuming” that occurs in the home (versus viewing consumption as something reserved for only the mall or grocery store [the public sphere]) (Moll et al. 2005).
Other mechanisms for reducing epistemic distance can be found in our agro-food system. Food labels seek to create “access points” to faraway lands and practices. “Fair trade” (Murray and Raynolds 2000), “organic” (Mansfield 2004), “GM free” (Teisl et al. 2002): numerous examples can be found of labeling being employed to attach information to a particular food commodity. Food labels allow us to “see,” for example, whether or not pesticides or herbicides where used in the raising of a given food, where a food was grown, and/or who was involved in that process. Another attempt to reduce this distance can be found in calculating what are called “food miles” (Boge 1993; Halweil 2002). Through the calculation of food miles, another aspect of our food system is made visible to the consumer that would otherwise remain hidden and distant: namely, the embedded energy (and waste) that went into transporting the food in question.
These strategies, however, are not with their problems. Like any attempt to “see” what is otherwise epistemologically distant, labels and food miles only reveal a piece of what is in reality a much larger whole. Thus, in shedding light on one aspect of a commodity (e.g., tons of fossil fuel burned in transporting food X from location Z to location Y), others components risk becoming even further hidden in the shadows (e.g., the energy consumed raising locally produced food in heated greenhouses).
A more fundamental question, however, still remains: do such strategies instill within people the ecological proclivities defined within ecological citizenship or does their use rest upon already existent “green” leanings? While such strategies are a step in the correct direction, I question if they instill within individuals the type of deep, non-instrumental commitments to the human and non-human realms as defined by ecological citizenship. In other words, while these strategies no doubt help individuals be more informed consumers, I question their potential to radically alter how individuals view the world around them.
Yet there remain still other means by which epistemic distance can be reduced. And while more epistemologically involved than those described above, they show potential for creating the type of deep commitments implied in ecological citizenship. Enter tactile spaces.
Ecological Citizenship and Tactile Space
Two cases will now be briefly examined that represent examples of what I call tactile space. The potential of these spaces reside not only in making abstract artifacts and processes meaningful to the everyday lives of individuals, which thus provides these spaces with the ability to reduce the earlier mentioned phenomenon of epistemic distance. But also, perhaps because of this ability to create lived experiences of these otherwise distant phenomena, tactile spaces have, as we shall see, the potential for instilling within individuals long-lasting behavioral changes. Such a discussion has particular relevance for the concept given Dobson’s (2003: 211) interest in investigating the merits of teaching ecological citizenship via the formal channels of the classroom (by looking at high school citizenship education programs in the UK). Against this, I argue that ecological citizenship is less something that one learns in the monological environment of a classroom and more something one tacitly experiences via a dialogue between self, others, and the environment. In what follows, a seed bank and two cases of community support agriculture are examined for the tactile spaces they create and support.
Case #1: Seed Savers Exchange
Data collection for this case study began in the summer of 2004. Twenty-two interviews were conducted between the months of June and July. After spending a number of months examining the data and emergent categories from these initial interviews, I then re-entered the field in the late-spring of 2005 to explore these categories further. Two additional visits were made to the research site at this time. During each, interviews were conducted, for a total of six additional interviews. In all, 28 interviews were conducted for this study. The length of each interview spanned from 20 minutes to, in a few cases, slightly over an hour. On average, however, interviews lasted between 30 and 40 minutes. In addition to personal interviews, copious field notes were also taken about the space itself (see e.g., Carolan [2006c] for a more detailed discussion of methods).
Seed Savers Exchange (SSE) is located near the town of Decorah, Iowa (US), in the far northeast corner of the state. Founded in 1975, SSE is a non-profit seed bank that both saves and sells “heirloom” fruit, vegetable, and flower seeds. On this 890 acre farm, which also goes by the name of “The Heritage Farm,” one will find a diverse genetic legacy. On it, there are 24,000 rare vegetable varieties, including about 4,000 “traditional” varieties from Eastern Europe and Russia. In addition, SSE possesses approximately 700 pre-1900 varieties of apples, which represent about every remaining pre-1900 variety left in existence (out of about 8,000 that once existed), and approximately 80 Ancient White Park Cattle (only about 800 of these animals remain in the world).
Unlike more conventional gene banks, SSE does not merely seek to store away genetic material in cold storage. SSE also works to make others interested in the seed saving process. Toward this end, they not only make available for sale the seeds being conserved (through a strong catalog and internet business as well as in their newly built visitors’ center), but they also teach others how to save their own seeds (through books, public lectures on the subject, tours, and annual meetings).
What one finds, then, upon entering SSE is a space build around the significance of tactile, embodied knowledge. Here, knowledge is not simply something one passively acquires by reading it or having it told to them. Rather, knowledge is actively acquired through doing and experiencing. Individuals therefore come to know the abstract, distant thing we call “agricultural biodiversity” by walking through the gardens and visitors’ center (where many of the seeds are on display) and by feeling seeds and various fruits and vegetables in their hands. Rather than knowing “the gene” of methodological reductionism—that is, as coded bits of protein as found in more conventional genes banks—individuals that visit SSE experience it for the ecologically embedded entity that it is. To know the genes of, say, Grandpa Ott’s Morning Glory (a small purple flower with a red star in the throat), is to know its evolutionary and socio-historical lineage (such as the point that it was brought from Bavaria to Iowa in the 1870s), to smell it, and feel it between one’s fingers. The knowledge conveyed at SSE, then, is not only tactile but also tacit, which is to say that the information one acquires through this space could never be conveyed linguistically in its entirety. It is obtained through doing, rather than through solely reading or listening (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Picture taken by Michael S. Carolan
I have spoken in detail of the epistemic immediacy of this space elsewhere (see e.g., Carolan 2006c). What interests me here, rather, is the transformational potential of this space, which is to say its ability to instill within individuals a deep, non-instrumental commitment to the human and non-human realms. The question then becomes: are their indications that SSE has the ability to instill within individuals such commitments? It appears so.
As one visitor explained to me, “I never fully appreciated things like genes and seeds before coming here. It’s just not something we’re taught to appreciate in this day and age. […] I guess you could say that this place has opened my eyes.”
While another explained, “I enjoy coming here with my kids because it provides an opportunity for learning that you just can’t get at school or by reading a book. The stuff here is real; you can feel it and take it home and grow it yourself. It’s just so much more accessible than a two-dimensional picture.”
Still another visitor explained it this way: “Seed Savers [SSE] has had a real effect on me. You just get such a deep appreciation for nature here. But it’s also more than that; you develop a greater appreciation for other people too. You meet so many wonderful and interesting people through this organization.”
These statements speak to a point made by Dobson (2003: 211), where he questions whether ecological citizenship can be taught within the formal channels of the classroom (which is somewhat surprising given his focus on high school citizenship education programs in the UK). Instead, he wonders if “lived experiences”—through which tacit knowledge is acquired—are not more effective for such transformations. The data collected from this space appear to suggest that they are.
Yet attitudes were not the only things that were changed through the experiences acquired at SSE. So too were practices. Comments like the following, which describe such behavioral chances, were not uncommon from the visitors I spoke with.
“I started gardening because of this place. […] Most of the vegetables that we eat in the summer now come from our garden.”
“I no longer buy my own seeds [because of what was learned through this space]. Why contribute to the problem when you can be the solution? It’s a good feeling knowing that you’re helping to keep these traditional varieties going.”
“This place opened my eyes to how agri-business, with its new hybrid varieties, has really taken a lot away from us. […] I’d say it’s in part because of this place, and the great people I’ve meet here, that I started going to farmers’ markets [as a grower] on a regular basis.”
In the end, it appears that SSE, in making such abstract and often only indirectly known phenomena as “genes” and “biodiversity” more meaningful to individuals, deeply affected how visitors of this space came to view these entities. And in some cases, those effects appeared to remain with individuals even after they had left the grounds of SSE. In those instances, then, something similar to ecological citizenship appears to have emerged.
These deep, non-instrumental commitments and obligations were no doubt an intentional goal of this space. If this were not the case, SSE could have adopted a more instrumental model of preservation, like that found at conventional gene banks. Rather, those interviewed spoke nothing of expecting something in return for their personal seed saving and gardening endeavors. Nor did respondents speak of reciprocal obligations. Indeed, one individual put this point clearly when she stated, “[Those of us in developed countries] need to step up and preserve these seeds since we are the ones responsible for their demise.”
The obligations this space evoked thus appeared to take a much “deeper” form. As one respondent put it, “I save seeds and do my part [for the environment] not because I have to, but because that is simply what one should do.” In short, it appears that SSE was doing much more than simply saving seeds. There are strong indications that it is also changing attitudes and shaping behaviors.
Case Study #2: Community Supported Agriculture
It has become almost a truism to speak of the global food system. Much of what we eat in the developed world has traveled many hundred (if not thousands) of kilometers before arriving on our dinner plate (Iles 2005). Food and agriculture more generally have become evermore faceless and placeless as consumers, producers, and the growing marketing sector are increasingly separated in geophysical space (Hendrickson and Heffernan 2002). In short, food, which is embedded within the global agro-food system, has become epistemologically distant from us and our lived worlds.
Spaces are emerging, however, that are seeking to reduce that distance, in both ontological (geospatial) and epistemological (meaningfulness to our everyday lives) terms. And these spaces, in making food more meaningful to the everyday lived world of individuals, can be seen as sowing the seeds for potentially significant changes in terms of individual attitudes and behaviors. Community supported agriculture (CSA) is one example of just such a space.
Research for this case study was conducted in the summer of 2003. Two CSAs located in central Iowa (US) were examined. In all, 22 personal interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. To further supplement the data, participant observation techniques were also employed (which were conducted while lending a hand gardening and delivering food to consumers). This led to approximately 10 additional hours of observations and informal discussions. All observations and interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed.
CSA consists of a group of individuals who pledge support to a farm or a group of farms and thus work together to create a local food system. Usually, members (or “share-holders”) pledge in advance to cover the anticipated costs for the year. CSA is therefore different from direct marketing because members commit to a full-season price in the spring and thus share in some of the risks that are inherent in farming. In return, members receive shares of what is produced for the year, as well as satisfaction gained from reconnecting to the land and participating in food production. In addition to receiving locally produced food, members are also encouraged to visit the farms and walk through the gardens to experience first hand where their food comes from and how it is grown. In short, CSA seeks to reduce the distance—in both physical and epistemological terms—between consumers, growers, and food. And the case study CSAs that were studied are of no exception.
Not only did consumers and growers meet each other on a regular basis, thus placing a face (literally) on the food they consumed. At both CSAs examined, “volunteer parties” were also held a few times a year, which brought non-growers to the farm to help harvest (which, it should be noted, is not a typical event for many CSAs). Such practices had the combined effect of reconnecting consumers and producers at a level rarely experienced in today’s global food system. Through such practices, consumers could put a face to their food and on who grew their food, while producers could put a face to those they helped to feed.
Like the seed banks described earlier, the CSAs examined also provided consumers with tacit knowledge. Ask any first-time farmer and they will tell you that food production is not something that can be completely taught to you. Rather, it is something you learn through doing. Non-growers, then, not only helped to pick their food, while attending such events as “volunteer parties,” but they also got an education in the process.
As one individual quipped, “You really can’t appreciate what goes into growing your food unless you actually participate in that process.”
While another explained, “The global food system leaves the consumer out in the cold, largely ignorant of all that goes into making our food—how it is raise, processed, packaged, shipped. […] We have no idea about what goes into producing the food we eat. That’s what I like about CSAs. All those barriers are torn down because we can experience the whole thing on a first hand basis.”
Sentiments like these were frequently expressed by respondents. The CSAs in question created a space where people, whether they were producers or consumers, could get to know “first hand” the entire food commodity chain from seed to dinner plate. Yet this was not the shallow form of knowledge created through a food label or point of origin stamp, which simply conveys information while allowing for no dialogic exchange to occur. At the CSAs examined (like SSE described earlier), individuals could actually walk through the gardens (e.g., during those aforementioned volunteer parties) that contained their food and experience that space in an immediate, tactile way. Knowledge thus became an embodied and active process, which involved doing and thus experiencing knowledge claims in a way that was meaningful to participants. Whereas the conventional food system often provides little insight into the practices used to raise our food, the CSAs studied allowed consumers the opportunity to not only to talk to farmers directly but also gave them the chance to participate in that very production process. Consumers could thus see, literally, the food as it was being raised as well as the methods employed and the values that guided that production process.
Admittedly, this meant that customers had to first be willing to take advantage of these opportunities. Thus, there might have been something “special” to begin with about those who chose to participate in the harvesting process, versus those who simply paid their annual subscription and had the food delivered to their doorstep (with their “participation” ending there). The transformational potential of these spaces has to thus be slightly tempered by the possibility that those most transformed by them likely had certain ecological citizenship-like proclivities to begin with. Yet this need not take away from the point that, at least among those that chose to engage with this space, attitudes and behaviors were significantly altered for some as a result of this embodied experience.
As one consumer explained, “CSAs almost force you to rethink our current situation. The freshness of the food, the quality, the social connections made—why can’t we grow more food like this? I started this to get cheap vegetables, but over the years I’ve learn that this is a more just way of growing and consuming food. I’d never go back.”
The above quote highlights an important component to what Dobson and others view as indication of the emergence of an ecological citizen: a deep commitment to the human and non-human realms motivated by non-instrumental, non-reciprocal beliefs. This is not to claim that all involved in the case study CSAs were radically transformed by such operations. A few, however, did indicate having undergone a certain transformation after being introduced to these spaces (such as the individual quoted above).
“Once I began questioning and wanting to know my food better I found myself wanting to have similar information about more of the products I buy.”
“Participating in CSAs has helped me to appreciate the value of not only food, it has also taught me to think about issues of equity and justice whenever I’m buying something. […] I’ve since switched to buying more fair trade and locally produced goods now because of my experience with CSAs.”
Statements such as these could be viewed as indicating the emergence of an (ecological) individual who views obligations toward human and non-humankind in non-reciprocal, non-contractual terms. In other words, the CSAs examined appeared to have a deep, lasting impact on at least some of its participants (although certainly not all). This is perhaps the most important (and hopeful) point to glean from this case study. For arguably the most salient component of ecological citizenship is the importance it places on deep commitments to issues of sustainability (however it is defined), versus a shallow type of human motivation that hinges on dis/incentives (which tend to cease once the dis/incentive is revoked). And such commitments appear to have been, at least in part, an effect of the tactile spaces and experiences that the CSAs examined helped to produce. As one grower quipped, “The ‘out of sight/out of mind’ mentality is just so prevalent today. CSAs attempt to bring food back into sight, which I believe has a big effect on how we think about food.”
Next Steps
One response to Dobson’s (2003: 174) question concerning “how do people become environmental or ecological citizens?” hinges on the lived experience. Gleaning insight from the case studies above, ecological citizenship could arguably be viewed as less something one learns (in the sense of being “schooled” on ecological citizenship) and more something one tacitly experiences. This brings us back to the point concerning the epistemic distance of the world around us and how it can problematize our abilities to think and act in sustainable ways. For as long as individuals remain epistemologically distant from many of the processes, effects, and artifacts of modernity, teaching individuals about the finer points of ecological citizenship will have only limited success.
In the above case studies, tactile spaces were created to make those otherwise distant artifacts of modernity more meaningful to people in terms of their everyday lives. Such spaces took various forms and involved different socio-material practices. Yet, in the end, each had degrees of success in causing individuals to internalize experiences and gain knowledge of non-human nature.
It is thus essential that future discussions of ecological citizenship not neglect the ever-important issues of epistemology, particularly if we hope for the concept to have any real, transformative potential. With that said, it is clear that not all phenomena are equal when it comes to creating tactile spaces. For instance, the sheer scale and complexity of global climate change presents challenges toward this end. The importance of reducing epistemic distance, however, should nevertheless encourage us to work through these difficulties for reasons related to ecological citizenship in particular and enriching public debate more generally. For as environmental problems, commodity chains, and asymmetrical economic/information flows continue to become more global in their scope, attempts must be made to concomitantly ground such artifacts in the lived worlds of the citizenry.
References
Alabaster T. and M. Hawthorne. (1999) ‘Information for Environmental Citizenship’, Sustainable Development 7: 25-34.
Bauman, Z. (1998) Globalization: The Human Consequences Cambridge: Polity.
Bell, D. (2005) ‘Liberal Environmental Citizenship’, Environmental Politics 14: 179-94.
Boge, S. (1993) Road Transportation of Goods and the Effect on the Environment. Wuppertal, Germany: Wuppertal Institute.
Carolan, M. S. (2004) ‘Ontological Politics: Mapping a Complex Environmental Problem’, Environmental Values 13:497-522.
. (2006a) ‘Do you see what I see? Examining the Epistemic Barriers to Sustainable Agriculture’, Rural Sociology forthcoming.
. (2006b) ‘Risk, Trust, and “the Beyond” of the Environment: A Brief Look at the Recent Case of Mad Cow Disease in the United States’, Environmental Values 15: 233-52.
. (2006c) ‘Ecological Representation in Deliberation: The Contribution of Tactile Spaces’, Environmental Politics 15: 345-61.
. (2006d) ‘Social Change and the Adoption and Adaptation of Knowledge Claims: Whose Truth do you Trust when it comes to Sustainable Agriculture?’ Agricultural and Human Values forthcoming.
Dean, H. (2001) ‘Green Citizenship’, Social Policy and Administration 35: 490-505.
Dobson, A. (2003) Citizenship and the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feyerabend, Paul (2000) The Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction vs. the Richness of Being. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Gardner G. and P. Stern (1996) Environmental Problems and Human Behavior. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Guy S. and E. Shove (2000) A Sociology of Energy, Buildings and the Environment: Constructing Knowledge, Designing Practice. New York: Routledge.
Hailwood, S. (2005) ‘Environmental Citizenship as Reasonable Citizenship’, Environmental Politics 14: 195-210.
Halweil, B. (2002) Home Grown: The Case for Local Food in a Global Market. Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute.
Haraway, D. (1992) Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Societies. London: Verso.
Held, D. (2000) ‘Regulating Globalization? The Reinvention of Politics’, International Sociology 15: 394-408.
Hendrickson M. and W. Heffernan (2002) ‘Opening Spaces through Relocalization: Locating Potential Resistance in the Weaknesses of the Global Food System’, Sociologia Ruralis 42: 347-69.
Iles, A. (2005) ‘Learning in Sustainable Agriculture: Food Miles and Missing Objects’, Environmental Values 14: 163-83.
Jelin, E. (2000) ‘Toward a Global Environmental Citizenship?’, Citizenship Studies 4: 47-63.
Kollmuss A. and J. Agyeman (2002) ‘Mind the Gap: Why do People act Environmentally and What are the Barriers to Pro-environmental Behavior?’, Environmental Education Research 8: 239-60.
Law, J. and J. Urry (2004) ‘Enacting the Social’, Economy and Society 33: 390-410.
Light, A. (2002) ‘Restoring Ecological Citizenship’, In B. Minteer and B. Taylor (eds.) Democracy and the Claims of Nature. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
. (2003) ‘Urban Ecological Citizenship’, Journal of Social Philosophy 34: 44-63.
Mansfield, B. (2004) ‘Organic Views of Nature: The Debate over Organic Certification for Aquatic Animals’, Sociologia Ruralis 44: 216-232.
Midgley, M. (1992) Science as Salvation: A Modern Myth and its Meaning. London; New York: Routledge.
Mol, A. (2002) The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Moll, H., K. Noorman, R. Kok, R. Engstrom, H. Throne-Holst, and C. Clark. (2005) ‘Pursuing More Sustainable Consumption by Analyzing Household Metabolism in European Countries and Cities’, Journal of Industrial Ecology 9: 259-75.
Murray, D. L. and L. T. Raynolds (2000) ‘Alternative Trade in Bananas: Obstacles and Opportunities for Progressive Social Change in the Global Economy’, Agriculture and Human Values 17: 65-74.
Pedersen, L. (2000) ‘The Dynamics of Green Consumption: A Matter of Visibility?’, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 2: 193-210.
Princen, T. (2002) ‘Distancing: Consumption and the Severing of Feedback’, In T. Princen, M. Maniates, and K. Conca (eds.) Confronting Consumption. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sassen, S. (1994) Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks/New York/London: Pine Forge Press.
Seyfang, G. (2005) ‘Shopping for Sustainability: Can Sustainable Consumption Promote Ecological Citizenhsip?, Environmental Politics 14: 290-306.
Shiva, V. (1998) ‘The Greening of Global Reach’, in G. Thuatail, S. Dalby, and P. Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, London: Routledge.
Stern P. (1992) ‘What Psychology Knows about Energy Conservation’, American Psychologist 47: 1224–1232.
Teisl M. F., L. Halverson, K. O’Brien, B. Roe, and N. Ross (2002) ‘Focus Group Reactions to Genetically Modified Food Labels’, AgBioForum 5: 6-9.
Urry, J. (2003) Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity
van den Burg, S., A. P.J. Mol, and G. Spaargaren (2003) ‘Consumer-Oriented Monitoring and Environmental Reform’, Environment and Planning 21: 371-388
Wackernagel M. and W. Rees (1996) Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers.
Sunday, March 29, 2009
Friday, March 27, 2009
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)